











Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch 














Center for Operations Research 
and Econometrics 
 





 CORE DISCUSSION PAPER 
2010/77 
 
Bargaining and delay in patent licensing 
 
Ana MAULEON 1, Vincent VANNETELBOSCH2  
and Cecilia VERGARI







We consider a model of licensing of a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside 
innovator)  negotiates  either  up-front  fixed  fees  or  per-unit  royal-  ties  with  two  firms  producing 
horizontally differentiated brands and competing à la Cournot. We investigate how licensing schemes 
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patent holder prefers to license by means of up-front fixed fees except if market competition is mild 
and the innovation size is small. Once there is private information about the relative bargaining power 
of the parties, the patent holder may prefer licensing by means of per-unit royalties even if market 
competition is strong. Moreover, the delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the patent 
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 1 Introduction
A license on a patent protected technology consists of a contract for which its le-
gal holder gives the right to exploit the technology to a third party (licensee) in
exchange for some up-front ￿xed fee or royalties. Patent licensing is a pro￿table
practice for the innovator to di⁄use the innovation. The innovator can be either an
outside innovator or one of the incumbent producers in the industry. The theoreti-
cal literature on licensing of cost-reducing innovations has mainly considered outside
innovators who have full bargaining power. That is, innovators are able to impose
some up-front ￿xed fee or per-unit royalty. In industries where ￿rms compete ￿ la
Cournot, licensing by means of per-unit royalties turns to be inferior to licensing by
means of posting an up-front ￿xed fee or auctioning licenses for an outside innovator,
regardless the industry size and the innovation size (see Kamien and Tauman, 1986;
Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Kamien, Oren and Tauman, 1992).1
However, there is some evidence that the relative bargaining power of a patent
holder and a licensee greatly in￿ uences the price of patents in licensing negotiations.2
Sakakibara (2010) has empirically examined the determinants of the price of patent
licensing using data about 661 patent licensing contracts in Japan which took place
between 1998 and 2003. She has found that factors a⁄ecting the pro￿tability of
patents and the bargaining power of the patent holder are good predictors of per-unit
royalties, while proxies for the reservation price of patent holders are less important
for the determination of per-unit royalties. In addition, she has found that the ￿t of
the per-unit royalty regression is always better than that of the ￿xed fee regression,
suggesting that the per-unit royalty represents patent licensing price better than
￿xed fee payment.3
1Sen (2005a) has shown that if the number of licenses can take only integer values, then for
an outside innovator in a Cournot oligopoly, royalty licensing could be superior to both ￿xed fee
and auction. Sen and Tauman (2007) have analyzed optimal combinations of up-front fees and
per-unit royalties for cost-reducing innovations for both outside and incumbent innovators.
2Based on survey data, Caves, Crookwell and Killing (1983) have found that on average only
40 percent of the rent from licensed technology is captured by a patent holder.
3Empirical studies have shown the wide prevalence of per-unit royalties in practice. For instance,
Rostoker (1984) and Macho-Stadler, Martinez-Giralt and Perez-Castrillo (1996) have found that
licensing by means of up-front ￿xed fees is less frequently used than choosing per-unit royalties
or combinations of up-front fees and royalties. Vishwasrao (2007) has considered a data set of all
the foreign technology licensing agreements entered into by manufacturing ￿rms in India between
1989 and 1993. Industry, ￿rm, and contract characteristics are used to explain di⁄erences between
the forms of payment in licensing contracts. She has found that licensing contracts are more
1In the present paper we consider a model of licensing of a non-drastic innova-
tion in which the patent holder (an outside innovator) negotiates either up-front
￿xed fees or per-unit royalties with two ￿rms producing horizontally di⁄erentiated
brands and competing ￿ la Cournot. The main feature of our model is that both
the patent holder and the ￿rms may have private information. To describe the bar-
gaining process, we adopt Rubinstein￿ s (1982) alternating-o⁄er bargaining model
with two-sided incomplete information, which allows for the occurrence of delays in
equilibrium.
We ￿nd that, under complete information, the patent holder prefers to license by
means of up-front ￿xed fees except if market competition is mild and the innovation
size is small.4 Once there is private information about the relative bargaining power
of the parties, the patent holder may prefer licensing by means of per-unit royalties
even if market competition is strong. In addition, per-unit royalties may be the
optimal choice even if the bargaining with two-sided incomplete information is close
to one with complete information.
We also obtain that the maximum delay in reaching an agreement is greater
whenever the patent holder chooses to negotiate up-front ￿xed fees instead of per-
unit royalties and remains ￿nite even when the period length between two o⁄ers
shrinks to zero. When brands are substitutable, royalty settlements create spillover
e⁄ects (by altering the ￿rms￿relative competitive positions in the product market)
that have implications for the outcome of negotiations. Spillover e⁄ects drive the
parties to concede more rapidly. In case of per-unit royalties, the number of licenses
sold has an ambiguous e⁄ect on the maximum real delay time in reaching an agree-
ment. When the patent holder chooses complete technology di⁄usion, ￿rms have
incentives to concede more rapidly because of increased spillover e⁄ects. However,
complete technology di⁄usion raises the potential payo⁄s for the patent holder, and
in expanding the payo⁄ set, also increases the scope for delay (longer negotiations
may be needed for screening the private information). In case of up-front ￿xed fees,
the rents to be divided do not depend on the negotiated fees. Hence, the maximum
likely to use royalties when sales are relatively high, while increased volatility of sales and greater
pro￿tability favor ￿xed fee contracts.
4Notice that the prevalence of royalties over ￿xed fees in practice can be explained, for instance,
by Bertrand competition (Muto, 1993), spatial competition (Caballero-Sanz, Moner-Colonques and
Sempere-Monerris, 2002; Poddar and Sinha, 2004), variation in the quality of innovation (Rockett,
1990), incumbent innovator (Shapiro, 1985; Wang 1998, Kamien and Tauman, 2002), or asymmetry
of information (Gallini and Wright, 1990; Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo, 1991; Beggs, 1992;
Sen, 2005b).
2real delay time in reaching an agreement in case of up-front ￿xed fees is greater than
the one in case of per-unit royalties.
Thus, the relative bargaining power of a patent holder and a licensee provides
a rationale for the wide prevalence of royalties in practice. Royalty could dominate
￿xed fee even if parties have almost complete information, independently of the
intensity of the market competition. In addition, the likelihood of having more
ine¢ cient outcomes in case of licensing by means of up-front ￿xed fees may explain
why licensing by means of per-unit royalties is commonly used in practice.
The existing literature of patent licensing under asymmetric information has
considered other sources of asymmetry that may explain the prevalence of royalties
over ￿xed fees in practice. In Gallini and Wright (1990), the value of the innovation
is private information to the innovator and the innovator is the only party who
can make o⁄ers. In Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1991), the value of the
innovation is private information to the buyer (a monopolist) and the innovator is
the only party who can make o⁄ers. In Beggs (1992), the value of the innovation
is private information to the buyer (a monopolist) and the monopolist is the only
party who can make o⁄ers. In Sen (2005b), the marginal cost of production is
private information to the buyer (a monopolist) and the innovator is the only party
who can make o⁄ers. So, in all these models either the innovator has full bargaining
power or the ￿rm has full bargaining power. In this paper, we provide a model of
licensing where both the innovator (patent holder) and the ￿rms (duopolists) have
private information and can make o⁄ers and counter-o⁄ers. In addition, our model
can explain the number of days between the date of application of the licensed
patents and the date of the licensing contracts as reported in Sakakibara (2010) and
the e⁄ects of market competition on price agreements and delays in reaching an
agreement.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is presented and we
describe and solve the up-front ￿xed fee (per-unit royalty) bargaining games for the
case of complete information. In Section 3 we analyzes the up-front ￿xed fee (per-
unit royalty) bargaining games with private information and we derive the maximum
delay in reaching an agreement. In Section 5 we conclude.
32 Model
We consider a duopolistic industry. Each ￿rm is producing one brand of a di⁄er-
entiated product. Let ￿rm i produce brand i in quantity qi. There is no entry or
threat of entry, and both ￿rms are quantity setters (Cournot competition). The
inverse demand function for the brand i of the di⁄erentiated product is given by
pi(qi;qj) = a ￿ qi ￿ ￿qj, i 6= j. The parameter ￿ 2 [0;1] represents the degree of
substitutability between both brands. The higher the ￿, the higher is the degree
of substitutability between i and j. When ￿ = 0, each ￿rm becomes a monopolist;
when ￿ = 1, both brands are perfect substitutes. With the old technology, both
￿rms produce with the identical constant marginal cost c where 0 < c < a. An
outside innovator (the patent holder) has been granted a patent for a non-drastic
inovation that reduces the marginal cost from c to c￿". A non-drastic innovation is
such that the non-purchasing ￿rm would produce a positive quantity at equilibrium.
Without loss of generality we set (a ￿ c) = 1; " 2 (0;1) is the innovation size. The
patent holder decides to license the new technology to one or both ￿rms but cannot
enter the market of the ￿nal good directly.
The strategic interaction between the patent holder and the duopolists is mod-
elled as a three-stage game. In the ￿rst stage, the patent holder decides how many
licenses to sell (complete technology di⁄usion or exclusive licensing) and the licens-
ing schemes (a non-negative up-front ￿xed fee or a non-negative per-unit linear
royalty). In the second stage, the patent holder and the duopolists bargain either
over a ￿xed fee or a per-unit royalty. In the third stage, the Cournot competition
takes place. The model is solved backwards. Let ￿i (￿i) be ￿rm i￿ s Nash equilib-
rium pro￿ts when both ￿rms produce with the old (new) technology. Let ￿i (￿i) be
￿rm i￿ s Nash equilibrium pro￿ts when ￿rm i produces with the new (old) technology
while ￿rm j produces with the old (new) technology, j 6= i. In case of non-negative
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where Ri is the per-unit royalty which is negotiated between the patent holder and
￿rm i.
2.1 Fixed fee licensing game
We denote by F(k) the ￿xed fee licensing game where the patent holder decides to
sell k licenses in the ￿rst stage.
We ￿rst consider the ￿xed fee licensing game with exclusive licensing, F(1), where
the patent holder and ￿rm i negotiate over the up-front ￿xed fee Fi. Production and
market competition occur only when either the patent holder and ￿rm i have come
to an agreement, or when one of the parties has decided to leave the bargaining
table forever.
The negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein￿ s (1982) alternating-o⁄er bargaining
model. The patent holder and ￿rm i make alternate ￿xed fee o⁄ers, with ￿rm
i making o⁄ers in odd-numbered periods and the patent holder making o⁄ers in
even-numbered periods. The length of each period is ￿. The negotiation starts in
period 0 and ends when one of the negotiators accepts an o⁄er. No limit is placed
on the time that may be expended in bargaining and perpetual disagreement is a
possible outcome. In case no agreement is reached between the patent holder and
￿rm i, the patent holder cannot try to reach an agreement with ￿rm j.5 Thus, ￿rm
j will continue producing with the old technology. The patent holder and ￿rm i
5This assumption is made for tractability when introducing incomplete information and being
able to use Watson￿ s (1998) results on bargaining with two-sided incomplete information. This
assumption implies that, under complete information, the patent holder cannot extract the same
rents as in Sempere-Monerris and Vannetelbosch (2001, 2002) because the patent holder cannot
threat ￿rm i of reaching an agreement with ￿rm j in case the negotiation fails. This assumption
makes more likely that the patent holder will choose complete technology di⁄usion.
5are assumed to be impatient. The patent holder and ￿rm i have time preferences
with constant discount rates rp > 0 and rf > 0, respectively. To capture the notion
that the time it takes to come to terms is small relative to the life of the patent,
we assume that the time between periods is very small. This allows a study of the
limiting situations in which the bargaining procedure is essentially symmetric and
the potential costs of delaying agreement by one period can be regarded as negligible.
As the interval between o⁄ers and countero⁄ers shortens and shrinks to zero, the
alternating-o⁄er model has a unique limiting subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE),
which approximates the Nash bargaining solution to the bargaining problem (see
Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986).6 Thus the predicted ￿xed fee is given by
F
SPE
i (1) = argmax[Fi]
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patent holder bargaining power that guarantees that ￿rm i prefers the Nash bargain-
ing solution to the outside option is given by ￿F
1 ￿ 4"(2 + " ￿ ￿)(2(1 + ") ￿ ￿)
￿2.
The patent holder￿ s equilibrium revenue, V F￿(1), is equal to F SPE
i (1). Firm i￿ s
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6The Rubinstein￿ s alternating-o⁄er bargaining model provides a useful guide for the interpreta-
tion and identi￿cation of the status quo or disagreement point in static models. The interpretation
of the status quo is no loss no gains as compared with the players￿positions during the negotia-
tion. So, it is not the outside options of the bargaining parties which are de￿ned to be the best
alternatives that players can obtain if they withdraw from the bargaining process. The presence
of outside options just places restrictions on the solution. See Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1986).
6We now consider the ￿xed fee licensing game with complete technology di⁄usion,
F(2), where the patent holder and ￿rm 1 negotiate over the up-front ￿xed fee F1
while the patent holder and ￿rm 2 negotiate over the up-front ￿xed fee F2. The
negotiations occur simultaneously and the agents are unaware of any proposals made
(or settlement reached) in related negotiations. Hence, each pair of negotiators takes
the decisions of the other pair as given while conducting its own negotiation. Each
negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein￿ s (1982) alternating-o⁄er bargaining model.
Then, the predicted ￿xed fees are given by
F
SPE
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ing V F￿(1) with V F￿(2) we obtain the following lemma. The proof of this lemma,
as well as the other proofs, may be found in the appendix.
Lemma 1. Consider the ￿xed fee licensing game. The patent holder prefers complete
technology di⁄usion rather than exclusive licensing except if the innovation size is
big and the market competition is strong.
7Notice that the patent holder￿ s preferences towards technology di⁄usion are in-
dependent of the bargaining power. The patent holder appropriates a share ￿ of
the pro￿ts, so that the higher the pro￿ts of the ￿rms are the higher the revenue of
the patent holder is. When market competition is mild (￿ small), both ￿rms make
high pro￿ts so that the patent holder prefers to sell two licenses. In contrast, when
market competition is strong and the innovation is almost drastic, the patent holder
prefers exclusive licensing because the innovating ￿rm will have a large cost advan-
tage which allows the innovating ￿rm to conquer most of the market. Exclusive
licensing is more likely as brands become closer substitutes.
2.2 Royalty licensing game
We denote by R(k) the per-unit royalty licensing game where the patent holder
decides to sell k licenses in the ￿rst stage.
We ￿rst consider the per-unit royalty licensing game with exclusive licensing,
R(1), where the patent holder and ￿rm i negotiate over the per-unit royalty Ri.
The negotiation still proceeds as in Rubinstein￿ s (1982) alternating-o⁄er bargaining
model. Thus the predicted royalty is given by
R
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on the patent holder bargaining power that guarantees that ￿rm i prefers the Nash
bargaining solution to the outside option. This upper limit is increasing in ￿ and ".
If the patent holder is very powerful (￿ > ￿R), then the equilibrium per-unit royalty,
RSPE
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We now consider the per-unit royalty licensing game with complete technology
di⁄usion, R(2), where the patent holder and ￿rm 1 negotiate over the per-unit
royalty R1 while the patent holder and ￿rm 2 negotiate over the per-unit royalty
R2. Each negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein￿ s (1982) alternating-o⁄er bargaining
model. Then, the predicted per-unit royalties are given by
R
SPE
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i = 1;2, i 6= j, where the status quo payo⁄s are zero, subject to ￿rm i￿ s outside
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and to 1=(2 + ￿)2 if ￿ > ￿R. As long as the patent holder is not too powerful
(￿ ￿ ￿R), the equilibrium per-unit royalty is increasing in ￿ and " but decreasing
in ￿. Notice that RSPE
i (1) ￿ RSPE
i (2). Comparing V R￿(1) with V R￿(2) we obtain
the following lemma.
9Lemma 2. Consider the royalty licensing game. The patent holder prefers exclusive
licensing rather than complete technology di⁄usion as long as the patent holder￿ s
bargaining power is not too strong, ￿ ￿ ￿R. Complete technology di⁄usion arises
when the patent holder is very powerful, ￿ > ￿R.
When the patent holder is very powerful (￿ > ￿R), the negotiation leads to a
royalty equal to the innovation size, independently of the degree of product di⁄er-
entiation (￿). Hence, the patent holder prefers to sell licenses to both ￿rms. In
contrast, when the bargaining power of the patent holder is weak, the equilibrium
royalty rate depends on the toughness of the market competition. In particular, the
patent holder can negotiate a higher price under exclusive licensing because the inno-
vating ￿rm, thanks to the cost advantage which is increasing with the competition,
makes higher pro￿ts and can a⁄ord a higher marginal cost. The more competitive
the market and the larger the innovation size, the more likely exclusive licensing will
be chosen (as ￿R is increasing in ￿ and ").
2.3 Fixed fee versus royalty
Which mode of licensing does the patent holder prefer under complete information?
Remember that "F(￿) (whose expression is given in Appendix A) is the cut-o⁄value
on " such that, in case of licensing by means of ￿xed fees, the patent holder prefers
exclusive licensing to complete technology di⁄usion if and only if " > "F(￿). This
cut-o⁄ value, "F (￿), decreases with ￿.
Proposition 1. The patent holder prefers to negotiate royalties if and only if ￿ <
2(
p
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1)=￿ and " < ￿(2 ￿ ￿)=(4 ￿ 2￿) < "F(￿). In addition, the patent
holder prefers to choose complete technology di⁄usion if and only if " < "F(￿).
Thus, in case of di⁄erentiated brands (￿ < 1), the patent holder prefers to
negotiate royalties when the market competition is mild (￿ < 2(
p
1 ￿ ￿+￿￿1)=￿)
and the innovation size is small (" < ￿(2￿￿)=(4￿2￿)). Notice that ￿(2￿￿)=(4￿2￿)
increases with ￿ but 2(
p
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1)=￿ decreases with ￿. Hence, as the patent
holder has almost all bargaining power (￿ ! 1), licensing by means of royalties
tends to be never optimal.7 However, in case of homogeneous brands (￿ = 1),
the patent holder always prefers to negotiate ￿xed fees whatever the bargaining
7In case of Bertrand competition, Muto (1993) has shown that licensing by means of royalties is
more pro￿table when the innovation size is small and the patent holder has full bargaining power.
Indeed, higher prices can compensate for higher royalty costs under Bertrand competition.
10power of the patent holder. Moreover, if the innovation size is not too large (" <
"F(￿ = 1) ’ 0:707), then the patent holder chooses complete technology di⁄usion.
Otherwise, the patent holder sells an exclusive license. The intuition is as follows.
A per-unit royalty rate represents an additional marginal cost of production for the
￿rms; hence, decreasing their pro￿ts. When market competition is very tough, as it
is under homogeneous brands, the patent holder prefers to bargain a ￿xed fee rather
than a per-unit royalty because the ￿xed fee allows the patent holder to appropriate
a higher share of the pro￿ts.8
Corollary 1. Suppose that ￿rms are producing homogeneous brands, ￿ = 1. In
case of bargaining with complete information, the patent holder prefers licensing by
means of ￿xed fees to licensing by means of per-unit royalties.
3 Bargaining with private information
3.1 Perfect Bayesian equilibria
Both the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and Rubinstein￿ s model predict e¢ -
cient outcomes of the bargaining process (in particular, agreement is reached imme-
diately). This is not true if we introduce incomplete information into the bargaining.
In this case, the early rounds of negotiation are used for information transmission
between the two negotiators. We now suppose that negotiators have private infor-
mation. Neither negotiator knows the impatience (or discount rate) of the other
party. It is common knowledge that the ￿rm￿ s discount rate is included in the set
[rP
f ;rI
f], where 0 < rP
f ￿ rI
f, and that the patent holder￿ s discount rate is included in
the set [rP
p;rI
p], where 0 < rP
p ￿ rI
p. The superscripts ￿ I￿and ￿ P￿identify the most
impatient and most patient types, respectively. The types are independently drawn
from the set [rP
i ;rI
i] according to the probability distribution pi, for i = p;f. We
allow for general distributions over discount rates. This uncertainty implies bounds







f). We assume that the upper bound on the patent holder bargaining
power is below some critical level, ￿ < ￿F
1 . This assumption guarantees that ￿rms
do not take their outside options when bargaining occurs in the presence of private
information.
8This result is in line with previous literature on optimal licensing (see Kamien (1992), Kamien,
Oren and Tauman (1992) and Kamien and Tauman (2002)), and so it is robust to any level of the
bargaining power when ￿xed fees and royalties are outcomes of negotiations.
11Lemma 3. Consider the bargaining with private information in which the distri-
butions pp and pf are common knowledge, and in which the period length shrinks
to zero. For any perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE), the payo⁄ of the patent holder
belongs to [V ￿(￿);V ￿(￿)] and the payo⁄ of ￿rm i belongs to [￿￿
i(￿);￿￿
i(￿)].
The proof of this lemma as well as of Lemma 4 may be found in Mauleon and
Vannetelbosch (2005). In Lemma 3, V ￿(￿) and ￿￿
i(￿) denote, respectively, the SPE
utility of the patent holder and the SPE pro￿t of ￿rm i of the complete information
game, when it is common knowledge that the patent holder￿ s bargaining power is
￿ = ￿. In case of exclusive licensing by means of a ￿xed fee, then V ￿(￿) and ￿￿
i(￿)
are given, respectively, by Expressions (1) and (2) with ￿ = ￿. In case of complete
technology di⁄usion by means of ￿xed fees, then V ￿(￿) and ￿￿
i(￿) are given, re-
spectively, by Expressions (3) and (4) with ￿ = ￿. In case of exclusive licensing by
means of a per-unit royalty, then V ￿(￿) and ￿￿
i(￿) are given, respectively, by Ex-
pressions (5) and (6) with ￿ = ￿. In case of complete technology di⁄usion by means
of per-unit royalties, then V ￿(￿) and ￿￿
i(￿) are given, respectively, by Expressions
(7) and (8) with ￿ = ￿. Similarly for ￿ = ￿. Lemma 3 follows from Watson￿ s
(1998) analysis of Rubinstein￿ s alternating-o⁄er bargaining model with two-sided
incomplete information.9 Lemma 3 is not a direct corollary to Watson (1998) Theo-
rem 1 because Watson￿ s work focuses on linear preferences, but the analysis can be
modi￿ed to handle the present case. Translating Watson (1998) Theorem 2 to our
framework completes the characterization of the PBE payo⁄s.
Lemma 4. Consider the bargaining with private information in which the period
length shrinks to zero. For any e V 2 [V ￿(￿);V ￿(￿)], e ￿i 2 [￿￿
i(￿);￿￿
i(￿)], there
exists distributions pp and pf, and a PBE such that the PBE payo⁄s are e V and e ￿i.
In other words, whether or not all payo⁄s within the intervals given in Lemma
3 are possible depends on the distributions over types. As Watson (1998) stated,
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 establish that ￿each player will be no worse than he would
be in equilibrium if it were common knowledge that he were his least patient type
and the opponent were his most patient type. Furthermore, each player will be no
9Watson (1998) has characterized the set of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) payo⁄s which
may arise in Rubinstein￿ s alternating-o⁄er bargaining game and constructed bounds (which are
met) on the agreements that may be made. The bounds and the PBE payo⁄s set are determined
by the range of incomplete information and are easy to compute because they correspond to the
SPE payo⁄s of two bargaining games with complete information. These two games are de￿ned by
matching one player￿ s most impatient type with the opponent￿ s most patient type.
12better than he would be in equilibrium with the roles reversed￿ . Since we allow for
general distributions over types, multiplicity of PBE is not an exception. There are
PBE in which the outcome is close to the upper bound, and there are PBE in which
the outcome is close to the lower bound.
In complete information, the patent holder prefers to license by means of ￿xed
fees when market competition is strong or when the innovation size is large. But,
from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, it follows that once the patent holder and the ￿rms
have private information, this complete information result does not necessarily hold.
Suppose that ￿rms are producing homogeneous brands, ￿ = 1. Suppose that the
patent holder chooses to negotiate a ￿xed fee. In case of non-exclusive licensing, the
patent holder and the ￿rms may reach a ￿xed fee agreement close to the lower bound
V F￿(2;￿), i.e. the outcome of the complete information game when it is known
that the patent holder bargaining power is ￿. For instance, the ￿rm may decide
to update much more optimistically its beliefs about the patent holder bargaining
power (putting probability one on the patent holder￿ s weakest type) in the case
the patent holder deviates from the equilibrium path. The new beliefs lead to a
continuation game in which the patent holder￿ s prospects have diminished, which
deters deviation in the ￿rst place and supports the equilibrium close to the lower
bound.10 Suppose now that the patent holder chooses to negotiate a per-unit royalty
and to sell only one license. Choosing an alternative mode of licensing modi￿es
the bargaining environment and can induce the bargaining process to switch to an
equilibrium close to the upper bound V R￿(1;￿), i.e. the outcome of the complete
information game when it is known that the patent holder bargaining power is ￿.
Since the upper bound on the patent holder￿ s revenue under exclusive licensing by
means of a per-unit royalty, V R￿(1;￿), is greater than the lower bound on the patent
holder￿ s revenue under non-exclusive licensing by means of ￿xed fees, V F￿(2;￿), the
patent holder may prefer exclusive licensing by means of a per-unit royalty to non-
exclusive licensing by means of ￿xed fees.
Corollary 2. Suppose that ￿rms are producing homogeneous brands, ￿ = 1. In
case of bargaining with private information, the patent holder may prefer exclusive
licensing by means of a per-unit royalty to exclusive or non-exclusive licensing by
means of ￿xed fees.
However, once it is common knowledge that the patent holder is stronger than
10Perfect Bayesian equilibrium allows great latitude for such revision of beliefs, because it occurs
o⁄ the equilibrium path.
13the ￿rm (￿ > 1=2), we recover the complete information result. Incomplete informa-
tion in the model takes into account two main features. The ￿rst one is the amount
of private information in possession of the players. By the amount of private infor-
mation we mean the size of the set in which player￿ s discount rate is contained and
which is common knowledge between the players. The second one is the uncertainty
about who is the more patient player, i.e. who has more bargaining power. When it
is common knowledge that the patent holder is stronger than the ￿rm, this second
feature disappears, and information tends to play a less crucial role in the process
of the negotiation between the patent holder and the ￿rms.
3.2 Bargaining with almost complete information
The previous analysis establishes bounds on the PBE payo⁄s, but it says nothing
about the possible payo⁄ vectors inside the bounds. It would be interesting to
study the set of payo⁄s that are supported by perfect Bayesian equilibria in the
bargaining game which is ￿ close￿to having complete information. Watson (1998)
has also studied the PBE payo⁄ set of Rubinstein￿ s alternating-o⁄er game under
arbitrary sequences of distributions over the players￿types which have the same
(possibly wide) support,11 yet which converge to a point mass distribution. That
is, he has examined bargaining games in which with high probability a player￿ s
discount rate is close to a certain value, yet there is a slight chance that the player￿ s
discount rate is much higher or much lower. He has shown that the set of equilibrium
payo⁄s does not converge to that of the complete information, despite that the game
converges to one of complete information. More precisely, the set converges from
above but not from below in the sense that a player cannot gain if there is a slight
chance that he is very patient (has a low discount rate), yet he can su⁄er if there
is a slight chance that he is impatient. In other words, a slight chance of being
a patient type can￿ t help a player, whereas a slight chance of being impatient can
certainly hurt. The limiting set of equilibrium payo⁄s is de￿ned by each player￿ s
greatest possible discount rate and the limiting discount rates; the players￿lowest
possible discount rates do not play a role. Watson￿ s main result can be extended
to our licensing bargaining model. It also furnishes intuition that is meaningful for
general distributions.
Suppose that there is three possible types for both the patent holder and the
11If rP
i and rI
i converge (for i = p;f) then the PBE payo⁄s of the incomplete information game











i) is (￿;1 ￿ 2￿;￿) for both the patent holder and the ￿rm; ￿ is the
probability that player i￿ s discount rate is rP
i , 1 ￿ 2￿ is the probability that player
i￿ s discount rate is r￿
i, and ￿ is the probability that player i￿ s discount rate is rI
i.
Then, we might wish to know how the set of PBE payo⁄s change as ￿ converges
to zero, where there is only a slight chance that player i is either of type rP
i or
type rI
i. From Watson￿ s (1998) Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, it follows that, as ￿
converges to zero, PBE outcomes do not converge to a single outcome, despite that
the distribution over types converges to a point mass distribution. There are PBE
in which the revenue is close to the upper bound V ￿(r￿
p;rI
f) and there are PBE in
which the revenue is close to the lower bound V ￿(rI
p;r￿
f).12
Corollary 3. Suppose that ￿rms are producing homogeneous brands, ￿ = 1. In case
of bargaining with almost complete information, the patent holder may prefer exclu-
sive licensing by means of a per-unit royalty to exclusive or non-exclusive licensing
by means of ￿xed fees.
3.3 Maximum delay in reaching an agreement
Ine¢ cient outcomes are possible, even as the period length shrinks to zero. The bar-
gaining game may involve delay, but not perpetual disagreement, in equilibrium.13
In fact, delay is positively related to the distance between the discount rates of the
most and least patient types of the players. If the range of types is reduced, then
this leads to a smaller range of possible payo⁄s and less delay. Delay can occur
even when the game is close to one of complete information (as the type distribu-
tions converge to point mass distributions). We propose to analyze the maximum
delay time in reaching an agreement.14 In the appendix we compute the maximum
12This lopsided convergence follows from the construction of PBE strategies, where players will
punish one another if they depart from their equilibrium strategies. An e⁄ective form of punishment
in the bargaining game is that when a player takes some deviant action, beliefs about him are
updated optimistically -putting probability one on his weakest type. The existence of a very
impatient type (a type near rI
i as compared to r￿
i ) allows the threat of such a revision of beliefs,
however small is the probability of the impatient type. The existence of a very patient type has
little e⁄ect, since it would not be used in punishing a player.
13Watson (1998) has constructed equilibria with delay in which the types of each player behave
identically (no information is revealed in equilibrium), players use pure strategies, and players
make non-serious o⁄ers until some appointed date.
14It is not uncommon in the literature on bargaining to analyze the maximum delay before
reaching an agreement. See, for instance, Cramton (1992) and Cai (2003).
15delay in equilibrium which shows that an agreement is reached in ￿nite time and




In case of licensing by means of ￿xed fees, the maximum real delay time in


















































is the maximum real time the ￿rm would spend negotiating. In fact, Dp(F) is the
maximum real time the patent holder would spend negotiating if it were of the most
patient type. Similarly, Df(F) is the maximum real time the ￿rm would spend
negotiating if it were of the most patient type. So, Dp(T) and Df(T) are the upper
bounds on the maximum time the patent holder of type rp and the ￿rm of type rf
would spend negotiating. This maximum time decreases with type rp (rf). So, the
more patient a player is the greater the delay that may be observed. Since Dp(T)
and Df(T) are positive, ￿nite numbers, the maximum real delay in reaching an




In case of exclusive licensing by means of a per-unit royalty, the maximum real
































































16is the maximum real time the ￿rm would spend negotiating. Since Dp(R(1)) and
Df(R(1)) are positive, ￿nite numbers, the maximum real delay in reaching an agree-
ment in case of exclusive licensing by means of a per-unit royalty is ￿nite and con-
verges to zero as rI
i and rP
i become close.
In case of complete technology di⁄usion by means of per-unit royalties, the max-
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is the maximum real time the ￿rm would spend negotiating. Since Dp(R(2)) and
Df(R(2)) are positive, ￿nite numbers, the maximum real delay in reaching an agree-
ment in case of complete technology di⁄usion by means of per-unit royalties is ￿nite
and converges to zero as rI
i and rP







Proposition 2. In case of complete technology di⁄usion by means of per-unit roy-
alties, a decrease in product di⁄erentiation (as ￿ increases) increases the maximum
real time the patent holder would spend negotiating but decreases the maximum real
time the ￿rm would spend negotiating.
When brands are substitutable, royalty settlements create spillover e⁄ects (by
altering the ￿rms￿relative competitive positions in the product market) that have
implications for the outcome of negotiations. Spillover e⁄ects are decreasing with
the degree of product di⁄erentiation. Spillover e⁄ects create incentives for ￿rms
to concede but incentives for the patent holder to make less concessions in order
to obtain greater royalties. Hence, it is ambiguous whether D(R2) increases or
decreases with ￿.
17Comparing (11) with (14) and (14) with (17) we have that Df(F) > Df(R(1)) ￿
Df(R(2)). Comparing (10) with (16) and (13) with (16) we have that Dp(F) >
Dp(R(2)) ￿ Dp(R(1)). The maximum real time the ￿rm would spend negotiating
in case of licensing by means of royalties is decreasing with the number of licenses
sold, but the maximum real time the patent holder would spend negotiating is
increasing with the number of licenses sold. Thus, in case of per-unit royalties, the
number of licenses sold has an ambiguous e⁄ect on the maximum real delay time
in reaching an agreement. When the patent holder chooses complete technology
di⁄usion, ￿rms have incentives to concede more rapidly because of increased spillover
e⁄ects. However, complete technology di⁄usion raises the potential payo⁄s for the
patent holder, and in expanding the payo⁄ set, also increases the scope for delay
(longer negotiations may be needed for screening the private information). In case
of ￿xed fees, the rents to be divided do not depend on the negotiated fees. For
instance, anticipating that an agreement will be reached in the negotiation with
￿rm j, the negotiation between the patent holder and ￿rm i has no incidence on the
payo⁄set of the negotiation with ￿rm j, and vice versa. Hence, the delay in reaching
an agreement does not depend on the number of licenses sold but only depends on
the private information. In addition, the maximum real delay time in reaching an
agreement in case of ￿xed fees is longer than the maximum real delay time in case
of per-unit royalties. The reason is the absence of spillovers.
Then, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement is longer
when the patent holder and the ￿rm negotiate over ￿xed fees. That is, D(F) >





f. Then, comparing (16) with (17) we have
that, in case of licensing by means of royalties, the maximum real delay time in
reaching an agreement is decreasing with the number of licenses sold.




f. Then, D(F) > D(R(1)) ￿
D(R(2)).
Thus, licensing by means of ￿xed fees instead of royalties would increase the
maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement. So, the likelihood of having
more ine¢ cient outcomes in case of licensing by means of ￿xed fees may explain
why licensing by means of per-unit royalties is commonly used in practice. We now





p = rI, rI = 0:36 ￿ rP with rP 2 [0:04;0:18]. Table 1 gives the integer
part of the maximum delay for the di⁄erent modes of licensing and for di⁄erent
values of the parameter ￿.15 We observe that (i) the real delay time in reaching an
agreement is not negligible: many bargaining rounds may be needed in equilibrium





￿ ￿; (iii) D(R(2)) is increasing with the degree of product
di⁄erentiation (￿); (iv) D(R(k)) is decreasing with the number of licenses sold (k).
F(k) R(1) R(2);￿ = 1
2 R(2);￿ = 3
4 R(2);￿ = 1
rP Dp Df Dp Df Dp Df Dp Df Dp Df
0.18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.16 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0.15 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0
0.14 3 3 2 2 2 1 2 1 3 1
0.13 4 4 2 2 3 2 3 1 4 1
0.12 5 5 3 3 4 2 5 2 5 2
0.11 7 7 5 4 6 3 6 3 7 2
0.10 9 9 6 5 7 4 8 4 9 3
0.09 12 12 8 7 9 5 10 5 11 4
0.08 15 15 10 9 12 7 13 6 14 5
0.07 20 20 14 11 16 9 18 8 19 6
0.06 26 26 19 15 22 12 23 10 25 8
0.05 36 36 26 19 30 15 32 13 34 11
0.04 51 51 38 26 43 21 46 18 49 15
Table 1: Maximum delay in reaching an agreement
15We can interpret ri as the annual discount rate and the numbers in Table 1 as the maximum
number of days needed to reach an agreement. Indeed, the integer part of the maximum delays
for ￿ = 1=365 are exactly the numbers in Table 1. The data in Table 1 seem consistent with the
number of days between the date of application of the licensed patents and the date of the licensing
contracts as reported in Sakakibara (2010).
194 Conclusion
We have considered a model of licensing of a non-drastic innovation in which the
patent holder (an outside innovator) negotiates either up-front ￿xed fees or per-unit
royalties with two ￿rms producing horizontally di⁄erentiated brands and competing
￿ la Cournot. We have studied how licensing schemes (￿xed fee or per-unit royalty)
and the number of licenses sold (exclusive licensing or complete technology di⁄usion)
a⁄ect price agreements and delays in reaching an agreement. We have obtained that
the patent holder prefers to license by means of up-front ￿xed fees except if market
competition is mild and the innovation size is small. However, once there is private
information about the relative bargaining power of the parties, the patent holder may
prefer licensing by means of per-unit royalties even if market competition is strong.
In addition, the delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the patent
holder chooses to negotiate up-front ￿xed fees instead of per-unit royalties. Thus,
the relative bargaining power of a patent holder and a licensee provides another
rationale for the wide prevalence of royalties in practice.
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Proof of Lemma 1.
￿ Case 1: ￿ < ￿F
1 < ￿F
2 . We have that V F(2) > V F(1) for ￿ < 0:585. For
￿ > 0:585, we have
V
F(2) > V
F(1) if and only if " <
2(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿) + ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)
p
2
2(4￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ 2)
￿ "
F(￿).
20Notice that "F(￿) is a decreasing function of ￿. In particular, "F(1) = 0:707
and "F(￿) < 1 if and only if ￿ > 0:91. Therefore, only for high values of ￿ and
", we have V F (1) > V F (2).
￿ Case 2: ￿F
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿F
2 . We have that
V






4(2 ￿ ￿ + ")"
(2 + ￿)
2 (2 ￿ ￿)
2 > 0
if and only if
￿ >
2(2 ￿ ￿ + ")"
(1 + ")





Notice that ￿T < ￿F
1 if and only if " < "F(￿). Thus, if " < "F(￿) then
V F (1) < V F (2); otherwise, V F (1) < V F (2) for ￿ > ￿T and V F (1) > V F (2)
for ￿ < ￿T.
￿ Case 3: ￿ > ￿F
2 . We have that
V
F (2) ￿ V
F (1) =
4(2 ￿ ￿ + " ￿ 2"￿)"
(2 + ￿)2 (2 ￿ ￿)
2 > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.
￿ Case 1: ￿ ￿ ￿R. We have that V R (1) ￿ V R (2) > 0 if and only if (2 ￿ ￿)￿￿
[(￿ ￿ 2)
2 (￿2￿2 ￿ 8￿￿ + 8) + 4"2 (8￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 2￿2 + ￿2￿2 + 8)+
4"(2 ￿ ￿)(4￿ + 8 ￿ 8￿￿ + ￿2￿2)]=[8(￿￿ ￿ 4)
2 (￿ + 2)(2 ￿ ￿)] > 0, which is
always true.
￿ Case 2: ￿ > ￿R. We have V R (1) ￿ V R (2) = (￿")=(￿ + 2) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. We only give the proof for the case
of homogeneous brands. The general proof involves tedious comparisons and is
available from the authors upon request. Let ￿ = 1. We already know that ￿F
1 <
￿F
2 < ￿R and ￿T < ￿R.
￿ Case 1: ￿R < ￿ < 1 and " < 0:707. From Lemma 1 we have that V F(2) >
V F(1). From Lemma 2 we have that V R(2) > V R(1). For ￿ = 1, we have
V F (2) ￿ V R (2) = 2"=9 > 0. Hence, the patent holder chooses to sell two
licenses by means of ￿xed fees.
21￿ Case 2: ￿F
2 < ￿ < ￿R and " < 0:707. From Lemma 1 we have that V F(2) >
V F(1). From Lemma 2 we have that V R(2) < V R(1). For ￿ = 1, we have
V F (2) ￿ V R (1) = (64" ￿ 3￿(2 ￿ ￿)(1 + 2")2)=72 > 0 since ￿ < ￿R. Hence,
the patent holder chooses to sell two licenses by means of ￿xed fees.
￿ Case 3: 0 < ￿ < ￿F
2 and " < 0:707. From Lemma 1 we have that V F(2) >
V F(1). From Lemma 2 we have that V R(2) < V R(1). For ￿ = 1, we have
V F (2) ￿ V R (1) = (16(1 + ")2 ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)(1 + 2")2)=72 > 0. Hence, the patent
holder chooses to sell two licenses by means of ￿xed fees.
￿ Case 4: ￿R < ￿ < 1 and " > 0:707. From Lemma 1 we have that V F(1) >
V F(2). From Lemma 2 we have that V R(2) > V R(1). For ￿ = 1, we have
V F (1) ￿ V R (2) = (2" ￿ 1)=3 > 0. Hence, the patent holder chooses to sell
only license by means of a ￿xed fee.
￿ Case 5: ￿F
1 < ￿ < ￿R and " > 0:707. From Lemma 1 we have that V F(1) >
V F(2). From Lemma 2 we have that V R(2) < V R(1). For ￿ = 1, we have
V F (1)￿V R (1) = (32(1+")"￿3￿(2￿￿)(1+2")2)=72 > 0 since ￿ > ￿F
1 and
" > 0:707. Hence, the patent holder chooses to sell only one license by means
of a ￿xed fee.
￿ Case 6: 0 < ￿ < ￿F
1 and " > 0:707. From Lemma 1 we have that V F(1) >
V F(2). From Lemma 2 we have that V R(2) < V R(1). For ￿ = 1, we have
V F (1)￿V R (1) = ￿(1+2")2(2+3￿)=72 > 0. Hence, the patent holder chooses
to sell only one license by means of a ￿xed fee.
B Maximum delay
B.1 Fixed fee licensing game
We ￿rst consider the ￿xed fee licensing game with exclusive licensing, F(1), where
the patent holder and ￿rm i negotiate over the up-front ￿xed fee Fi. Production and
market competition occur only when either the patent holder and ￿rm i have come
to an agreement, or when one of the parties has decided to leave the bargaining
table forever. The negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein￿ s (1982) alternating-o⁄er
bargaining model. The patent holder and ￿rm i make alternate ￿xed fee o⁄ers, with
￿rm i making o⁄ers in odd-numbered periods and the patent holder making o⁄ers in
even-numbered periods. The negotiation starts in period 0 and ends when one of the
22negotiators accepts an o⁄er. No limit is placed on the time that may be expended
in bargaining and perpetual disagreement is a possible outcome. The patent holder
and ￿rm i are assumed to be impatient. The patent holder and ￿rm i have time
preferences with constant discount factors ￿p 2 (0;1) and ￿f 2 (0;1), respectively.







p ￿ V F(Fi) are, respectively, ￿rm i￿ s payo⁄ and the patent holder￿ s payo⁄. For
any ￿xed fee bargaining which leads to perpetual disagreement, disagreement payo⁄s
are set to zero. As in Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986), the SPE ￿xed fee




i (Fip) = ￿f ￿ ￿
F
i (Fif)
V F(Fif) = ￿p ￿ V F(Fip);
where Fip is the SPE ￿xed fee outcome if the patent holder makes the ￿rst o⁄er, Fif
is the SPE ￿xed fee outcome if the ￿rm makes the ￿rst o⁄er, and subject to ￿rm i￿ s
outside option of not buying the license (￿
F
i ￿ ￿F




only if 4"(2 + " ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿2 (2 + ￿)
￿2 ￿ Fi. Since the patent holder makes the
￿rst o⁄er, the unique SPE ￿xed fee is given by
F
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We now consider the ￿xed fee licensing game with complete technology di⁄usion,
F(2), where the patent holder and ￿rm 1 negotiate over the up-front ￿xed fee F1
while the patent holder and ￿rm 2 negotiate over the up-front ￿xed fee F2. The
negotiations occur simultaneously and the agents are unaware of any proposals made
(or settlement reached) in related negotiations. Hence, each pair of negotiators takes
the decisions of the other pair as given while conducting its own negotiation. Each
negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein￿ s (1982) alternating-o⁄er bargaining model.





i (Fip) = ￿f ￿ ￿
F
i (Fif)
V F(Fif) = ￿p ￿ V F(Fip);
23where Fip is the SPE ￿xed fee outcome if the patent holder makes the ￿rst o⁄er, Fif
is the SPE ￿xed fee outcome if the ￿rm makes the ￿rst o⁄er, and subject to ￿rm









and only if 4"(2 + "(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)
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￿2 ￿ Fi. Since the patent holder
makes the ￿rst o⁄er, the unique symmetric SPE ￿xed fee is given by
F
SPE









4(2 + "(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿)"
(2 ￿ ￿)
















8(2 + "(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿)"
(2 ￿ ￿)















4(1 ￿ ￿ (1 + ")) + ￿2 (1 + 2" + "2)
(2 ￿ ￿)




for i = 1;2.
Suppose now that the players have private information. They are uncertain
about each others￿discount factors. It is assumed that player i￿ s discount factor















4"(2 + " ￿ ￿)(2(1 + ") ￿ ￿)
￿2 which guarantees that each ￿rm will never take the
outside option at equilibrium. Since we allow for general probability distributions
over discount factors, multiplicity of PBE is not an exception. From Watson (1998),




















In case of exclusive licensing (k = 1), the maximum number of bargaining periods


















































Notice that I (mp(F(1))) is simply the integer part of mp(F(1)). It is customary to
express the players￿discount factors in terms of discount rates, rp and rf, and the
length of the bargaining period, ￿, according to the formula ￿i = exp(￿ri￿), for
i = p;f. With this interpretation, player i￿ s type is identi￿ed with the discount rate
ri, where ri 2 [rP
i ;rI







24i = p;f. Note that rI
i ￿ rP
i since greater patience implies a lower discount rate. As















































which is a positive, ￿nite number. Notice that Dp(F(1)) converges to zero as rP
i
and rI
i become close, for i = p;f. The maximum number of bargaining periods ￿rm



































































which is a positive, ￿nite number. The maximum real delay time before reaching an








In case of complete technology di⁄usion (k = 2), the maximum number of bar-













































which is a positive, ￿nite number. The maximum number of bargaining periods ￿rm












































which is a positive, ￿nite number. The maximum real delay time before reaching an








and we have that Dp(F(1)) = Dp(F(2)), Df(F(1)) = Df(F(2)), D(F(1)) = D(F(2)).
B.2 Royalty licensing game
We ￿rst consider the per-unit royalty licensing game with exclusive licensing, R(1),
where the patent holder and ￿rm i negotiate over the per-unit royalty Ri. The ne-
gotiation still proceeds as in Rubinstein￿ s (1982) alternating-o⁄er bargaining model.




i (Rip) = ￿f ￿ ￿
R
i (Rif)
V R(Rif) = ￿p ￿ V R(Rip);
where Rip is the SPE royalty if the patent holder makes the ￿rst o⁄er, Rif is the
SPE royalty if the ￿rm makes the ￿rst o⁄er, and subject to ￿rm i￿ s outside option
of not buying the license (￿
R
i ￿ ￿R
i if and only if " ￿ Ri). Since the patent holder
makes the ￿rst o⁄er, the unique SPE royalty is given by
R
SPE


























(2 + ￿)(2(1 + ") ￿ ￿)
2
2(1 ￿ ￿f￿p)
















(2 + ￿)2 (2(1 + ") ￿ ￿)
2
(1 ￿ ￿f￿p)






We now consider the per-unit royalty licensing game with complete technology
di⁄usion, R(2), where the patent holder and ￿rm 1 negotiate over the per-unit
26royalty R1 while the patent holder and ￿rm 2 negotiate over the per-unit royalty
R2. Each negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein￿ s (1982) alternating-o⁄er bargaining




i (Rip;Rj) = ￿f ￿ ￿
R
i (Rif;Rj)
V F(Rif;Rj) = ￿p ￿ V F(Rip;Rj);
where Rip is the SPE royalty if the patent holder makes the ￿rst o⁄er, Rif is the
SPE royalty outcome if the ￿rm makes the ￿rst o⁄er, and subject to ￿rm i￿ s outside




i if and only if " ￿ Ri). Since the patent
holder makes the ￿rst o⁄er, the unique symmetric SPE royalty is given by
R
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, i = 1;2,
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, i = 1;2:
Consider now the case where players have private information. It is assumed that















p) ￿ 4=(2(1 + ") ￿ ￿) which guarantees that each ￿rm will never
take the outside option at equilibrium. In case of exclusive licensing (k = 1), the
maximum number of bargaining periods the patent holder would spend negotiating,
















































































Notice that I (mp(R(1))) is simply the integer part of mp(R(1)). We can express
the players￿discount factors in terms of discount rates, rp and rf, and the length of
the bargaining period, ￿, according to the formula ￿i = exp(￿ri￿). Then, player
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which is a positive, ￿nite number. The maximum number of bargaining periods ￿rm







































































































which is a positive, ￿nite number. The maximum real delay time before reaching an








In case of complete technology di⁄usion (k = 2), the maximum number of bar-
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28which is a positive, ￿nite number. The maximum number of bargaining periods ￿rm

























































































































which is a positive, ￿nite number. The maximum real delay time before reaching an
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